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ABSTRACT 
Naïve theories of behavior hold that actions are caused by an agent’s intentions, 
and the subsequent success of an action is measured by the satisfaction of those 
intentions. But when an action is not as successful as intended, the expected causal link 
between intention and action may distort perception of the action itself. Four studies 
found evidence of an intention bias in perceptions of action. Actors perceived actions to 
be more successful when given a prior choice (e.g., choose between two words to type) 
and also when they felt greater motivation for the action (e.g., hitting pictures of disliked 
people). When the intent was to fail (e.g., singing poorly) choice led to worse estimates 
of performance.  A final experiment suggested that intention bias works independent 
from self-enhancement motives. In observing another actor hit pictures of Hillary 
Clinton and Barack Obama, shots were distorted to match the actor’s intentions, even 
when it opposed personal wishes. Together these studies indicate that judgments of 
action may be automatically distorted, and that these inferences arise from the expected 
consistency between intention and action in agency.  
Word count: 186 
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 Action Embellishment: An Intention Bias in the Perception of Success 
The perceived link from intention to action in human behavior is a fundamental 
aspect of social cognition, and has repeatedly captured the attention of researchers 
interested in the naïve psychology of action (Heider, 1958), the intentional stance 
(Dennett, 1987), the folk concept of intentionality (Malle & Knobe, 1997) and theory of 
mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  The crux of these lay theories is the expectation that 
intentions cause actions, and moreover that stronger intent should result in more 
successful actions. Unfortunately, people often fall short of this ideal. Our lives are 
polluted with countless typos, pratfalls, botched parallel parking attempts, and many 
other instances where actions do not live up to our ambitions. But when best laid plans go 
awry, the expectation of consistency between intention and action may blind people to 
the true extent of their failure.  In this research we suggest that such an intention bias can 
result in distorted perceptions of action. The success of observed actions may be 
embellished above actual performance, to be consistent with the strength of the 
underlying intention.    
 
Intention as the Cause of Action 
  An old adage warns the road to Hell is paved with good intentions. The inherent 
irony in this proverb is the violation of common sense causality: good intentions ought to 
lead to good outcomes. It is this expectation that leads students study hard for exams 
because they think it will result in a better grade, or for athletes to visualize success 
before an important play. The relationship inferred between intentions and actions is 
more than an association of similarity—it is the basis of a specialized attribution system   Action Embellishment               4 
 
 
commonly applied to agents (Wegner, 2002). An agent is an entity that moves by self-
propulsion (e.g., humans, animals, robots), in contrast with inanimate objects that move 
only by external physical force (Michotte, 1963; Molina, Van de Walle, Condry, & 
Spelke, 2004). In other words, an agent is its’ own cause, or a “first cause”.   But the 
ultimate source of action is seen as the intention to act: agents move because they want 
to, toward some desired outcome (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997).   
  Like other kinds of causal judgments, agency judgments are often snap decisions 
that occur spontaneously and effortlessly (Hassin, Bargh & Uleman, 2002), suggesting 
automatic processing (Bargh, 1994; Uleman 1999). As noted by Guthrie (1993), the 
automaticity of agent detection is an important evolutional advantage - in identifying who 
might be potential enemies, friends, mates, predators, or prey. The mere appearance of 
self-propelled movement in a target is often enough to prompt attributions of agency 
(Premack, 1990; Morewedge, Preston, & Wegner, 2007), especially if the end state of 
movement appears to satisfy some goal (Heider & Simmel, 1958; Csibra, Gergely, Biro, 
Koos, & Brockbank, 1999). Apparent symmetry between one’s own intentions and 
actions also cues judgments of agency in the self, reinforcing feelings of conscious will 
over own behavior when it seems consistent with a prior intention (Wegner & Wheatley, 
1999; Dijksterhuis et al, 2008).  
  Yet at times this equation between intention and action appears incomplete, either 
because the actor’s intention is unknown or the action is ambiguous. In such cases, an 
observer can reconcile the two by adopting a model of ideal agency (Wegner, 2002; 
Preston & Wegner, 2005). In an ideal agent, intentions always translate perfectly into 
action and actions always satisfy prior intention. Expected consistency between intention   Action Embellishment               5 
 
 
and action may help to fill in occasional “blind spots” by matching what is missing to 
what is observed: creating a prior intention to explain action, or distorting the perception 
of action to align with intention.  For example, watching another person performing an 
action (e.g., roommate scrubbing the floor), may instantly prompt thoughts of underlying 
motivation consistent with that action (e.g., to impress a coming houseguest) (McClure, 
2002). The ability to instantly mind-read the invisible mental states of others proves to be 
an essential social skill (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Sacks, 1995), as people do not usually 
publicize their intentions before action, like calling shots in a pool game.  Fortunately, 
inferences of intention can occur automatically (Hassin, Arts, & Ferguson, 2005), which 
allows one to quickly make sense of social interactions as they happen, and to respond in 
a timely fashion.  
Efficiency gained in automatic judgments of intention is sometimes at the expense 
of accuracy, however, and these mistakes are often in the direction of aligning intentions 
and actions together.  For example, outside observers tend to see others’ actions as 
internally motivated, and largely ignore the influence of external factors that constrain 
behavior (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988).  Observers also tend to interpret others’ 
behavior as approach motivated toward the obtained outcome, even when the true 
motivation was to avoid another, undesirable, outcome (Miller & Nelson, 2002). 
Interestingly, similar mistakes can also be made in judging own intentions. Early 
hypnosis studies showed that subjects would explain odd behaviors triggered by post-
hypnotic suggestion by generating a (sometimes equally unusual) prior intent (Moll, 
1888). Cases of split-brain patients who have had their corpus callosum severed, and so 
have no communication between left and right brain hemispheres,  provide some vivid   Action Embellishment               6 
 
 
examples of confabulating intentions for actions when they cannot access the true reason 
for behavior (Gazzaniga, 1988; Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978).   For instance, one split-
brain patient giggled in response to a nude picture shown only to her left visual field, but 
she told the experimenters she laughed because “the machine was funny”.  Although she 
did not really know why she laughed, she quickly concocted a reason that made sense and 
accounted for her behavior (Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978). Evidence from the cognitive 
dissonance and self-perception literatures have also long shown that judgments of own 
attitudes (and the behavioral intentions they carry) can be altered post-hoc to be 
consistent with action (Wicklund & Brehm, 1976; Bem, 1972). Most remarkable about 
these various confabulations is that they are almost always made with certainty and 
sincerity (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Even when people observe themselves act 
without knowing why, they can concoct a prior intention that explains the behavior, 
seamlessly weaving the reasons for action into their ongoing personal narrative.   
Intention Bias 
Just as people show an action bias in judgments of intention, distorting prior 
intentions to correspond with observed behavior, they may also show the reverse error: an 
intention bias in judgments of action. For example, a tennis player could see the ball fall 
inside the line when everyone in the gallery sees it outside, or a person telling a joke 
could think it was a hit when everyone else thought it was a flop. Some evidence suggests 
that strengthening intention can embellish general estimates of action: although people 
tend to perceive themselves as above-average on a variety of qualities, these effects are 
exaggerated on those traits which are desirable and controllable (Alicke, 1985), and on 
traits that people judge to have an intentional component (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004).   Action Embellishment               7 
 
 
Strengthening intention can also enhance predictions for future action, although it may 
not always translate into actual behavior (Koehler & Poon, 2006).  People become more 
optimistic about their gambling prospects as they become more involved in the process 
(Langer & Roth, 1975; Risen & Gilovich, 2007), or desire for success is particularly 
intense (Biner, Angle, Park, Mellinger, & Barber, 1995; Thompson, Armstrong & 
Thomas, 1998), both of which may contribute to a feeling of intentionality.  Furthermore, 
when making a decision people begin to exhibit exaggerated positive illusions 
(unrealistic optimism about success of action) only after they finish deliberating about an 
action and have shifted to a post-decisional phase (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), i.e., they 
have decided on a plan for action and are preparing to put that plan into motion.    
These findings suggest that strong intentionality can distort judgments of action in 
the past, future, or in the abstract.  But because lay theories of intention-to-action 
causation may be inherent to human cognition, an intention bias may also work 
automatically to embellish perceived action.  Yet there is little research to show that such 
distortion can occur in real time, as the action takes place. One likely reason is that these 
other forms of self-assessments are more ambiguous, and therefore benefit from the 
biased selection of memories, or idiosyncratic criteria that define success (Dunning, 
Meyerwitz, & Holzberg, 1989). This is in sharp contrast to judgments made during the 
observation of the action itself. Often performance feedback is immediate and 
unforgiving (e.g., either the ball goes through the hoop or it doesn’t).  But even so, 
perception is rarely picture-perfect and is partially constructed by top-down processes 
that mold our experience to match beliefs and expectations (Pearson, Clifford, & Tong, 
2008). For instance, carrying a heavy load one one’s back can make the slope of an   Action Embellishment               8 
 
 
upcoming hill appear steeper (Proffitt, 2006), but having choice over action reduces this 
effect, making distances and slopes seem more surmountable (Balcetis & Dunning, 
2007).   Likewise, action itself may be distorted as it occurs if the actual success is 
unclear.  Actions may be ambiguous because they happen quickly (e.g. plays in a 
baseball game), or the result is not immediately available for review (e.g., grade on a 
test).  In such cases perceptions of actions may bend toward their intent, so that better 
actions should appear from stronger intentions. Because these judgments can occur 
automatically, one may never be aware of the distortion until corrected by the cold hard 
facts. But until such negative feedback is given, a fly ball may look like a homerun, a 
bombed test could seem like an ace, and if your good intentions should lead you straight 
to Hell- it could still look like Heaven when you get there.    
The Present Research 
In this research we predict that an automatic intention bias can distort the 
perception of action as it occurs. As intention to succeed increases so should perceptions 
of success, irrespective of actual performance. Four specific predictions were tested. 
First, factors that increase perceived intentionality (e.g. desire, choice) should result in 
action embellishment, distorting the perceived success above actual performance. 
Second, distortions should be consistent with the direction of intention: cases in which an 
agent’s intention is to do poorly, perceived success should be diminished rather than 
embellished. For example, a tennis player who deliberately tries to throw a match may 
see the ball fall outside the line, when everyone else saw it fall inside. Third, the degree 
of distortion should correspond with the intensity of intentionality: actions executed with 
stronger intent should be embellished more than actions only weakly intended. Finally, an   Action Embellishment               9 
 
 
intention bias is separable from self-enhancement biases: distortions should extend 
beyond the self to actions performed by other agents. When the intentions of another 
agent are salient, the apparent success of action should be distorted to be consistent with 
the actors’ intentions, irrespective of one’s own personal desires.  
In four studies, participants engaged in an activity (e.g., a typing task), or 
observed another engage in an activity, and reported the success immediately following 
each attempted act.  In Experiments 1 and 2, intentionality was manipulated by the choice 
before action.  In Experiments 3 and 4, desire for an outcome was used as an indicator of 
intention, specifically, the desire to hit a target picture of a liked vs. disliked person.  
EXPERIMENT 1: GOOD INTENTIONS 
Participants engaged in a typing study on a computer and reported 
estimates of typing accuracy throughout the task. For half the typing trials 
participants chose between two words to type, and on half the trials no choice was 
given.  In pretests, we found word choice was associated with stronger feelings of 
intent to type the word. There was also a between subject factor of difficulty. In the 
difficult condition participants completed the typing task while wearing gardening gloves 
that made it more difficult to press individual keys. Greater embellishment was expected 
in this difficult version of the task for two reasons. First, increased difficulty is a 
detriment to performance, allowing more room for embellishment (Moore & Healey, 
2008). More relevant to the present hypotheses, the difficult task would require more 
effort, another indicator of intentionality (Bargh, 1994; Preston & Wegner, 2007). The 
increased effort felt in the difficult version should enhance the perceived intention 
strength, and thereby further amplify perceived performance.   Action Embellishment               10 
 
 
Method 
Participants  
Ninety-nine participants were recruited by flyers in the Psychology department 
for $5 payment. 
Procedure 
Participants were greeted by an experimenter and seated in front of a computer in 
a private lab room. All instructions were given on the computer. Participants were 
informed that a seven-letter word would appear on the computer screen, and that their job 
was to type the word as accurately as possible without looking at the keys on the 
keyboard. To prevent any temptation to cheat, the characters on the keys were covered by 
round yellow stickers. After each word was typed, participants estimated how many 
letters of the word they had typed correctly, from zero to seven, and entered this estimate 
into the computer.  The specific scoring criteria were given to participants during the 
instructions, along with examples for each.  Points were deducted if the participant 
missed a letter, typed an incorrect letter, had two sequential letters out of order, or for any 
extra letters typed.  For instance, for the target word “OCTOPUS”, 6/7 points would be 
given for mistakes such as: OCOPUS, OCTIPUS, OCTOUPS, or OCTOPUSS. Scores 
could not be lower than zero.    
Using a mixed design, the task consisted of 100 typing trials. All participants 
completed 50 choice trials and 50 no-choice trials.  On no-choice trials, a single seven-
letter word was presented on the screen which subjects were asked to type. On choice 
trials, two different seven-letter words were presented side by side, and the participants 
chose which word to type. There was also a between-subject factor of difficulty. In the   Action Embellishment               11 
 
 
easy condition the task was to simply type a word on the screen without looking at the 
keyboard. In the difficult condition participants wore heavy gardening gloves as they 
typed, which made it more difficult to press individual keys. All words were presented in 
24 point Garamond type, and remained displayed on screen as the participant typed. No 
feedback about the success was given to participants.   After typing the word, participants 
pressed the enter key to proceed to the next trial. Two orders were used: no-choice/ 
choice; choice/ no-choice, randomly assigned at the beginning of the study. The sequence 
of trials within each section was randomly generated.   
Results 
Difficulty 
Mean scores for perceived and actual typing accuracy was calculated for both 
choice and no-choice trials. The difference between participants’ perceived performance 
and actual performance on a given typing trial represented the degree of distortion for 
that trial. Using these means a 2 (Choice) × 2 (Distortion: Actual vs. Perceived typing) × 
2 (Difficulty: Easy vs. Difficult) × 2 (Order) ANOVA was conducted, with repeated 
measures on the first and second variables. There were no main effects or interactions 
with Order, so we dropped this variable from further analyses and conducted a 2 
(Choice) x 2 (Distortion) x 2 (Difficulty) ANOVA. There was a robust effect of difficulty 
condition, F (1, 97) = 135.69, p < .001, ηP
2= .58, such that both actual and estimated 
performance were lower in the difficult version. In addition, there was a two-way 
interaction between distortion and difficulty, F (1, 97) = 61.64, p < .001, ηP
2= .39, with 
greater positive distortion in the difficult version vs. the easy version. That is, participants 
in the difficult condition embellished their typing performance (Mactual = 2.14, SD = 1.65;   Action Embellishment               12 
 
 
Mreport = 3.36, SD = 1.72) whereas participants in the easy condition underestimated 
performance (Mactual = 6.64, SD = 1.11; Mreport = 5.54, SD = 1.60).  This is consistent with 
previous research demonstrating greater embellishment for difficult tasks (Moore & 
Healy, 2008). Further, difficult tasks require more effort and attention to execute which 
also denotes intention strength. Consistent with our hypothesis, expending these 
resources could lead to embellished perceptions of performance relative to the actual 
success of the action. 
Choice 
Our principal hypothesis that choice would increase embellishment was supported 
by a two-way interaction between Distortion and Choice, F (1, 97) = 11.13, p = .001, ηP
2 
= .10 (see Figure 1).  Typing estimates for the choice trials (M = 4.53 letters; SD = .20) 
were significantly greater than both the typing estimates for no-choice trials (M = 4.37, 
SD = .25; F (1, 97) = 10.87, p = .001), and actual typing performance on choice trials (M 
= 4.25, SD = .26; F (1, 97) = 4.69, p < .05). In other words, participants thought they 
typed better when first given a choice versus no choice, and this perceived success on 
choice trials was embellished above their actual performance.  Despite this perception, 
choice did not improve actual performance (Mchoice = 4.25, SD = .26, Mno-choice = 4.31, SD 
= .20; F (1, 97) = 1.30, ns).  This predicted effect of Choice on distortion held up for both 
the easy version (F (1, 46) = 6.34, p < .05, ηP
2= .12) and the difficult version (F (1, 51) = 
4.56, p < .05, ηP
2= .08).  This embellishment was not observed on no-choice trials, 
estimated performance was consistent with actual performance (Mperceived = 4.37, SD = 
.25; Mactual = 4.31, SD = .20, F < 1).    Action Embellishment               13 
 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, both increased choice and increased difficulty resulted in 
positive distortions of action.  First, task difficulty contributed to embellishment. Those 
who participated in a difficult version of the task (typing with gloves on) overestimated 
their performance relative to actual performance, whereas those in the easy version (no 
gloves) underestimated performance. One possible reason for this interaction with 
difficulty is that they are due to an effect of regressive judgments when feedback is 
ambiguous.  In other words, when actual accuracy is quite low (high difficulty condition), 
people will make greater estimates, but when actual accuracy is quite high (low difficulty 
condition), estimates tend to be lower (e.g., Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999).  However, 
these results could also be explained by embellishment effects, consistent with our 
hypothesis. Difficult tasks require more effort, which also indicates intention strength. 
The difficulty experienced in the task might increase embellishment by increasing the 
exertion put into the action. But more important than the effect of difficulty condition, we 
observed a strong effect of choice on embellishment. As predicted, participants 
overestimated their typing performance when they had been given a choice between two 
words to type, but did not embellish their performance in the absence of choice. And 
although participants believed they were better typists when given a choice, in reality 
they typed equally well without the choice. In sum, the results of Experiment 1 provide 
initial evidence that people embellish actions consistent with an intention bias.  
EXPERIMENT 2: BAD INTENTIONS  
In Experiment 1, choice prior to action led to inflated perceptions of action. An 
alternative interpretation of this result is that it reflects a self-serving distortion (Miller &   Action Embellishment               14 
 
 
Ross, 1978), and so might be explained by a need to feel good about the self (Taylor & 
Brown 1988).   Experiment 2 addressed this question by attempting to reverse this 
effect—causing people to diminish performance, rather than embellish, if they intended 
to fail, rather than succeed. Ordinarily people do not try to fail, but there are certain 
circumstances under which people might deliberately sabotage their own actions. For 
example, a professional athlete might be bribed to take a dive in an important sporting 
match, or a reluctant law student might try to bomb the LSAT to avoid entering the 
family business. If actions are embellished when intention to succeed is high, then by the 
same token actions ought to be diminished when trying to fail. In Experiment 2, 
participants recorded themselves singing two brief excerpts from pop songs; but they 
were told the goal was to sing as poorly as possible. We expected that choice would 
result in exaggerated perception of the action to match their overall intention, in this case, 
that their singing performance will seem worse than actual performance.  
Method 
Participants  
27 undergraduates (9 men, 18 women) volunteered to take part in a voice sample 
study, for 3$ payment or partial course credit.  
Instructions 
Participants were seated in a private lab room in front of a computer. The 
experimenter explained to participants that they would be asked to record their voice 
during the study on a tape recorder beside the computer, and were given instructions on 
how to use the recorder. Participants were then left alone in the room, and instructions 
were given on the computer before the task began:   Action Embellishment               15 
 
 
You will be asked to sing two short songs, and we will record your voice 
to be rated by other people at another time. There is a twist to this study: 
Your job in this study is to try to sing as BADLY as possible.  Remember, 
the people who will listen to you later won't know you are trying to sing 
badly. So, please don't try to be funny or “cheesy” as you sing, just try to 
give a really poor singing performance. 
Task 
Participants sang two short excerpts from popular songs into the tape recorder; 
once with a choice of two songs to sing, once with no choice. The three song selections 
used were Billie Jean by Michael Jackson, You Give Love a Bad Name by Bon Jovi, and 
I’m Too Sexy by Right Said Fred. These songs were found in pretests to be familiar to 
undergraduate participants.  In three conditions, each song was used once as the no-
choice option, with the other two songs as the choice option. When participants were 
ready to sing, they began recording on the tape recorder and the computer provided the 
song lyrics on the monitor. The song excerpts consisted of two verses.  Following each 
performance, participants were asked to rate the quality of own singing on an 11-point 
scale (0 = The absolute worst, 10 = Perfect).  
Results 
Two judges, blind to condition, listened to the participants’ recordings and rated 
their performances on the same scale participants evaluated themselves (0 = The absolute 
worst, 10 = Perfect). These two judges had an inter-reliability rating of α = .78.  The 
mean rating of the two judges was calculated for each performance.    Action Embellishment               16 
 
 
To assess whether subjects rated their own performance as worse, relative to 
judges, we conducted a  2 (Choice: none, choice) × 2 (Rater: self, judge) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the first variable. There were no main effects of Rater, F (1, 26) = 
1.06, ns, nor of Choice, F (1, 26) = 1.89, ns. But as predicted, there was a two-way 
interaction between Rater and Choice on evaluations of singing performance, F (1, 26) = 
4.11, p = .05 (see Figure 2).  Participants gave lower ratings of their own singing when 
they chose which song to sing, compared to when no choice was given, (Mchoice = 2.19; 
SD = 1.06, Mno-choice = 2.70; SD = 1.54; F (1, 26) = 5.43, p < .05).  In contrast, judges’ 
ratings did not differ with respect to choice, (Mno-choice = 2.72; Mchoice = 2.78, F < 1).  
Relative to the judges’ ratings, participants underestimated their performance following 
choice, (Mself = 2.19; Mjudge = 2.78; F (1, 26) = 3.94, p =.06). When no choice of song was 
given, self ratings were consistent with the judges’ evaluations, (Mself = 2.70; Mjudge = 
2.72, F < 1).   
Preference for Song  
   Finally, we also tested whether there were any differences in participants’ song 
choice, and whether this affected the participants ratings. When Billie Jean was forced 
and there was a choice between I’m Too Sexy,  and You Give Love a Bad Name, no song 
was preferred over the other, χ
2 (1, n = 7) < 1, ns.  But when given the choice,  Billie Jean 
was selected significantly more often (n = 18) than either You Give Love a Bad Name (n 
= 1) or I’m Too Sexy (n =1; χ
2 (2, n = 20) = 12.8, p = .002). Given this clear preference 
for Billie Jean, it was important to rule out the possibility that our observed 
embellishment effects were driven by the more frequent selection of a difficult song.  
Two one-way ANOVA’s confirmed that there were no significant differences in self-  Action Embellishment               17 
 
 
ratings across song choice, F (2, 24) = .435, p = .65), nor judge-ratings across song 
choice (F (2, 24) = 1.352, p = .28) These results support the hypothesis that diminished 
perceptions of own  performance were driven primarily by the act of choosing (rather 
than by particular song selection.   
Discussion 
The results show that choice can result in diminished perceptions of performance, 
if the actor’s overall intention is to fail rather than succeed. Self-assessment corresponded 
with the judges’ assessments when no choice was given, but when participants were 
given a choice of song to sing poorly they rated their performance more poorly than 
judges did. We can conceptualize these results as a mirror image of those from 
Experiment 1, with only perceived success following choice deviating from the other 
values. But whereas participants embellished their performance in Experiment 1, 
participants in this study perceived worse performance following choice when they had 
been trying to perform poorly.  The fact that participants in the present study diminished 
their actions, rather than embellished, indicates that these distortions may be guided by 
the specific intention of the actor, not just a general bias towards positivity or success.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3: MIXED MOTIVES 
In two studies actions were embellished to be closer to the intended goal when the 
actor was first given a choice prior to action. We have suggested these action 
embellishment effects result an expectation of consistency between intention and action.  
But choice is dichotomous—like a light switch is either on or off—and so it can be 
insensitive to the experienced intensity of intentionality which can amplify or dampen   Action Embellishment               18 
 
 
embellishment effects. In the present study, desire for a particular outcome was used as a 
measure of intention strength. Desire can be experienced at various intensities and so 
might better predict the degree of an observer’s distortion. Also, whereas choice 
embodies key cognitive components of intentionality (e.g., the decision for action, and 
the identification of a specific goal), an agent’s desire could be considered the “heart” of 
intentionality as it represents both the underlying reasons for action, and the motivation  
that drives them.  
In a paradigm modeled after Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff (1986), participants in 
the present study engaged in a shooting task with a toy gun.  The targets used were either 
well-liked people (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi) or extremely disliked people (e.g., Adolf 
Hitler). As in the study by Rozin and colleagues, it was expected people would be more 
motivated to hit disliked people vs. liked people.  In this present experiment we made a 
new prediction: regardless of actual performance, perceptions of accuracy would change 
with the liking of a target.  The effect of liking on actual performance was limited by 
making aim difficult to control. Consistent with their desire to do well, we hypothesized 
that people would embellish performance when the target was disliked.      
Method 
Participants 
One hundred fourteen participants (62 women, 52 men) were recruited by flyers 
in the Psychology Department or through the Psychology subject pool. Participants 
received payment of 7$ or course credit.    Action Embellishment               19 
 
 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
We pretested several famous figures for familiarity and likeability, from which we 
selected 4 disliked figures and 4 liked figures as targets.  The liked figures were Albert 
Einstein, John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mahatma Gandhi. The disliked 
figures were Osama Bin Laden, Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and OJ Simpson. In a 
pretest there was a strong negative correlation between target likability (1 = dislike 
extremely, 7 = like extremely), and own intention to hit the target figure (1 = Do not 
intend, 7 = Strongly intend), r (64) = -.66, p < .001.  
A slide projector displayed the target faces onto a large piece graph paper with a 
grid of one-inch squares. All photos selected were black and white, in which the target 
person was facing forward and making eye contact with the camera. The projected image 
was 36” × 24”.   The paper had a large florescent pink circle in the center to serve as the 
bull’s-eye, which was centered between the targets’ eyes. Participants fired at the target 
with a shotgun-style toy gun with foam bullets. After hitting the target, the bullets would 
fall to the ground.  The toy gun used was a discontinued model, unfamiliar to 
participants, and difficult to aim with precision.
 1   
Procedure 
Before the experimental session began, participants gave liking ratings for all the 
target figures. For each target, participants first indicated whether they generally liked or 
disliked the person. If they disliked the person, degree of dislike was rated on a negative 
7-point scale (-1 = dislike slightly, -7 = dislike intensely). If they reported liking the 
                                                 
1 Difficulty in shooting  was verified by one of the authors through extensive pretesting, in the name of 
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person, they rated their liking on a positive 7-point scale (1 = like slightly, 7 = like 
intensely). 
It was explained to subjects that their task was to try to shoot at a target, and to 
estimate their own performance after each shot. Participants faced a wall with a large 
graph paper with a grid of one inch squares, at a distance of ten feet away. In pretests, the 
grid on the target was not visible to participants at this distance. The experimenter (a 
research assistant blind to hypotheses) stood adjacent to the target area during the task 
and recorded the location of each shot on the grid as they occurred. Immediately 
following each shot, subjects estimated in inches how close they were to the bull’s-eye of 
the target. Subjects were given 10 practice trials with no target face before the study 
began. A total of 96 trials were used, 12 trials per figure.   
Results 
  One subject reported knowing OJ Simpson personally and was excluded from all 
further analyses, leaving a sample of 113 participants.  
Embellishment and Dislike 
Overall, the pretested liked figures were rated as more likable, M = 4.78, SD = 
1.18, than the pretested disliked figures, M = -5.35, SD = 1.22; F (1, 112) = 2756.46, p < 
.0001. However, 27 of the 113 participants deviated from the majority opinion for at least 
one of the famous figures.  The most controversial figures were OJ Simpson, who was 
liked by 11 participants, and John F. Kennedy who was disliked by 9 participants. In fact, 
for almost all the figures there was some deviating attitude among participants, with the 
sole exception of Adolf Hitler who earned unanimous reports of dislike.    Action Embellishment               21 
 
 
Mean actual and perceived accuracy were calculated for Liked (Gandhi, King, 
and Einstein) and Disliked Figures (Bin Laden, Hitler, Hussein). Because Simpson and 
Kennedy were so controversial among participants’ ratings, we did not include them in 
these discrete categories. In the few remaining cases in which a person’s preferences 
deviated from the majority, we used participant’s own attitudes to create the categories of 
Liked and Disliked Targets. Using these means, we conducted a 2 (Liking) × 2 
(Distortion: Actual vs. Reported Marksmanship) ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
second variable. There was a main effect of Distortion, such that people generally 
overestimated their distance from the bull’s-eye (Maccuracy , = 6.16 inches,  Mreport = 6.78 
inches; F (1,112) = 11.70, p = .001, ηP
2= .10). It is unknown whether this overestimation 
of distance reflected a general modesty, however we expect it was due to a general 
miscalibration of distance. More relevant to our hypotheses, there was an expected two-
way interaction between Liking and Distortion, F (1, 112) = 7.24, p < .01, ηP
2= .06. 
Although actual marksmanship did not vary between disliked targets vs. liked targets, (F 
< 1), people reported better marksmanship when firing at disliked targets (Mdisliked = 6.57 
inches; SD = 2.31, Mliked = 6.89, SD = 2.73; F (1,112) = 5.15, p < .05, ηP
2= .04). 
Degree of liking 
Using the categories of Liked and Disliked targets there was greater reported 
marksmanship toward the Disliked targets, consistent with our predictions. But more 
specifically, we were interested in whether the degree of embellishment would be 
influenced by intensity of liking or disliking. The intensity of attitudes toward the targets 
should correspond with intention to succeed. Thus, embellishment should increase as the 
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when shooting at pictures of Hitler (M = 6.45 inches), also the most disliked figure on 
average (Mlike = -6.57). All eight targets were rank-ordered by mean liking.  Using this 
rank order, reported distance, actual distance, and distortion were submitted to a repeated 
measures ANOVA using a linear contrast. The linear contrast was significant on reported 
distance, F (1, 112) = 5.40, p < .05, with better perceived performance for worse liked 
targets. Important however, there was no linear trend on actual distance, F < 1. Perhaps 
more important, the distortion between actual and reported distance showed a significant 
linear trend, F (1, 112) = 7.15, p < .01. Mean judgments of marksmanship were distorted 
further from the actual hit as mean liking for the target increased (see Table 1).   
Because individuals varied in their ranking and the intensity of liking/ disliking, it 
was important to take into account these differences by conducting a within-subject 
correlation between liking and distortion. Reported liking was re-coded to a 14-point 
scale, (1 = intensely dislike, 14 = intensely like).  For each participant, the mean 
distortion between reported and actual distance was calculated for each of the eight 
targets. Correlations were conducted for each participant between these eight distortion 
scores and the individuals’ reported liking, and then transformed into Fisher z-scores. 
Using a one-sample t-test, this mean correlation between personal liking and distortion 
was found to be significantly greater than zero, r (113) = .12, p < .05, with greater 
distortion towards hitting the bull’s-eye as personal liking decreased.  This correlation 
appeared to be driven entirely by the participants’ reported success on the task, and not 
actual success. Using the same analyses, participants’ liking for the target and their actual 
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negatively correlated (r (113) = -.11, p < .05). Participants perceived better 
marksmanship as they personally disliked the specific target being hit.  
Finally, we investigated the possibility that participant's liking for a target 
influenced their correlational accuracy (i.e., the correlation between actual and perceived 
marksmanship). In other words, while we have established that participants distorted their 
judgments of accuracy depending on how much they liked the target, it is also possible 
that participant's actual and perceived accuracy correlated differently across targets. 
Accordingly, the correlation between reported and actual distance was calculated for each 
target within each participant. Next, correlations between these 8 correlational accuracy 
scores and reported liking were computed (using the same 14-point liking scale as 
above). A one-sample t-test on the resulting mean correlation between correlational 
accuracy and personal liking was not found to be significantly different from zero, r 
(113) = -.003, ns. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 3, desire for an action led to greater action embellishment. People 
perceived better marksmanship when aiming at disliked targets vs. liked targets. The 
degree of this distortion was also consistent with the reported intensity of liking/disliking.  
These results provide further evidence that an intention bias can distort the perception of 
action.  
An alternative explanation for these results is that liking and disliking affected 
perception due to wishful thinking, unrelated to any causal theories of agency.  It feels 
bad to see Gandhi get hit and better to see Hitler get hit - whether or not it is oneself   Action Embellishment               24 
 
 
doing the hitting. It is possible participants may have seen what they wanted to see, rather 
than what they intended to do. As noted by many philosophers, it can be tricky to 
separate desires from intention (Mele, 1988; Searle, 1984). And in this case, there is a 
natural confound between intention and preferred result. But this is not necessarily the 
case when one observes the actions of another agent. In Experiment 4, we try to 
disentangle the two by changing the target act to that of another person.  
EXPERIMENT 4: OTHERS’ INTENTIONS 
In three studies, people embellished perceptions of their own actions when they 
felt greater intentionality.  These studies provide support for an intention bias in judging 
actions, but to this point, judgments have been limited to the self’s actions. Own actions 
might benefit from embellishment to a greater extent than others’ actions, in part because 
there is an introspective advantage in knowing one’s own (good) intentions (Kruger & 
Gilovich, 2004). But if the intentions of another agent are well known, people should 
expect the same consistency between intentions and actions for that agent as they would 
for themselves - sometimes even contrary to personal wishes. In the present study, we 
examined whether an intention bias extends to the actions of other agents. In judging the 
actions of others, people should use that agent’s intention as a cue. Actions should be 
embellished to match the intention of the actor, not the intentions of the self.   
In this study, participants observed an actor throw a ball at two different targets:  
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, who at the time were in a highly publicized 
competition for the Democratic Party nomination in the 2008 U.S. Presidential election.  
Participants observed a video of an actor throwing a ball at pictures of Clinton and 
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the participants were told that the actor was a Democrat who supported Clinton, and the 
other half were told he was a Democrat who supported Obama.  We hypothesized that 
observers would see perceive the pitcher’s shots to be closer to the target for the opposed 
candidate , (i.e., the Clinton supporter better at hitting Obama vs. Clinton, and vice versa 
for the Obama supporter) and further, this effect should be mediated by the perceived 
intention of the actor.  Also important, this bias should emerge regardless of the 
observers’ own political attitudes.  When the intentions of the actor are clear, perceptions 
of action would be distorted by the perceived intent of the actor, rather than the wishes of 
the observer.  
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-nine undergraduates (22 men, 47 women) participated in the study for 
partial course credit.  
Procedure 
All data was collected between January and March 2008, as senators Clinton and 
Obama competed in primaries for the Democratic Party nomination to run for President 
in the 2008 U.S. election. Participants were seated in front of a computer in a private 
room. Participants viewed a brief clip on the computer of a Caucasian male, who stated 
his political affiliation and voting intention for the 2008 Illinois Democratic primary 
presidential election. In the Clinton supporter condition the man on the video said he 
intended to vote for Clinton in the primary, in the Obama Supporter condition he said he 
intended to vote for Obama. After watching this clip, participants rated on 7-point scales 
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much the actor intended to hit Clinton and Obama, respectively (1 = Not at all, 7 = 
Strongly intend).     
Video Judgments. Participants then watched 32 video clips of the actor pitching a 
ball at a picture of Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama, 16 shots per target. As in 
Experiment 3, the pictures were projected onto a wall, with a large red dot on the target’s 
nose.  All participants watched the same 32 clips, shown to participants in a random 
order.  Marksmanship (distance to bull’s eye) ranged from 1 – 12 inches, and clips for 
were matched on marksmanship for throws at Clinton and Obama, respectively.   
Immediately following each clip, participants estimated the distance of the shot to the 
target bull’s-eye, in inches, to the nearest two decimal places.  
Retrospective Judgments. After viewing all the video clips, subjects rated how 
well the pitcher hit Clinton and Obama,  respectively,  on two separate  7-point scales (1 
= Very bad hitting Clinton/ Obama, 7 =  Very good hitting Clinton/ Obama), and also 
how much the pitcher tried to hit Clinton and Obama, respectively (1 = Did not try, 7 = 
Tried very hard). Finally, participants reported which candidate they personally preferred, 
and which party they expected to vote for in the 2008 election.  
Results 
Pre-Task Judgments.  
  Before watching the video, participants were asked to rate whom they believed 
the actor was going to vote for in the Democratic primary on a 7 point scale (1= 
Definitely vote for Clinton, 7 = Definitely vote for Obama).Responses were analyzed by 
between-subjects ANOVAs. Participants in the Obama supporter condition believed that 
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Clinton supporter condition believed he would vote for Clinton (M = 1.67 SD = .92).  
Judgments of actor intention to hit Clinton and Obama, respectively, were given 
immediately following the manipulation and prior to the distance judgment task, and 
analyzed  by between-subjects ANOVA
2.  As expected, perceived intention to hit Clinton 
was stronger for the Obama supporter (M = 5.86, SD =  1.33), compared to the Clinton 
supporter (M = 2.91,  SD  = 1.84, F (1, 66) =58.45, p < .001, ηp
2 =.47), and perceived 
intention to hit Obama was stronger for the Clinton supporter M  =5.25,  SD = 1.85) vs. 
Obama supporter (M = 2.39, SD = 1.52, F (1, 66) =49.06, p < .001, ηp
2 =.42).  A single 
intention score was calculated by the difference between intention ratings, with greater 
scores indicating more intent to hit Clinton vs. Obama.  Overall intention score was 
significantly different between affiliation conditions, F (1, 66) =68.99, p < .001 ηp
2 =.51.  
and correlated with predicted vote of the actor, Pearson’s  r (68) = .73,  p  <  .001.  
Task Embellishment  
Perceived performance was assessed by judgments of distance to the bull’s eye 
for each observed throw.  We tested our central hypothesis that the actions would be 
distorted to according to the affiliation of the actor using a 2 (Target: Clinton/ Obama) × 
2 (Actor Affiliation: Clinton/ Obama) ANOVA on distance scores, with repeated 
measures on the first variable. There were no main effects of Target (F (1, 67) =2.36, p = 
.13), nor Affiliation (F < 1). Consistent with our hypothesis, the two-way interaction 
between Target and Affiliation was significant, F (1, 67) = 4.21, p < .05, ηp
2 =.06. Task 
embellishment was defined as the mean difference between judgments, such that greater 
                                                 
2 One participant did not complete items on prior intent, data analyzed using remaining 68 participants. 
   Action Embellishment               28 
 
 
scores indicate better perceived marksmanship on pictures of Clinton vs. Obama. The 
actor was perceived to be better hitting the bull’s eye on Obama vs. Clinton when he was 
presented as a Clinton supporter (M = -.05 inches), but worse hitting Obama vs. Clinton 
when presented as an Obama supporter (M = .36 inches).    
Retrospective embellishment.   
After all clips, participants were asked to rate how well the pitcher hit Clinton, 
and Obama, respectively.  Retrospective embellishment was defined as mean difference 
between scores, such that greater scores better marksmanship for Clinton vs. Obama. 
There was a main effect of Supporter condition on the retrospective judgments of 
performance, F (1, 67) = 6.59, p < .05, ηp
2 =.09. Important, retrospective embellishment 
correlated with pre-task intention r (69) = .37, p < .01, and embellishment during the 
task, r (69) = .30, p < .05. Using linear regression, we found evidence that the main effect 
of condition on retrospective embellishment was mediated by judgments of intention 
before the task. When controlling for pre-task intention, condition did not predict 
retrospective embellishment, β = .05, t < 1, ns, but intention significantly predicted 
retrospective embellishment when controlling for condition, β = .34, t = 1.93, p =.05.  As 
a test of mediation, a Sobel test was conducted on the regression of condition on 
intention, and intention on embellishment, Sobel z = 2.86, p < .001,  indicating perceived 
intention before the task mediated the effect of condition on retrospective embellishment, 
see Figure 2.   
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Observer Preference 
Finally, it was important to examine whether the perceptions were affected by the 
viewer’s own attitudes toward the targets.  Overall 76% of participants favored Obama, 
12% participants preferred Clinton, and 12%  reported no preference.  Because the 
preferences were highly skewed, we examined the perceived marksmanship towards the 
favored candidate and disfavored candidate (excluding the undecided participants).  A 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on perceived accuracy for liked vs. disliked 
target according to own preferences. Own political preference had no effect on 
perceptions of accuracy (F = 1.83, ns).  Including undecided participants, no correlation 
between own preference and the distortion difference between targets was found, r (69) = 
- .03, ns.  
 
Discussion 
Experiment 4 found that intention bias extends to judgments of other agents’ 
actions. When an actor was presented as a Clinton supporter, people thought he was 
better at hitting Barack Obama, whereas when he was presented as an Obama supporter, 
people thought he was better hitting Clinton. Also important, participants’ own attitudes 
towards the candidates did not distort the perceived success of the actor. These results 
suggest that when the intentions of another actor are known, the other’s actions are 
distorted to match that other’s intentions, and are not distorted by one’s own intentions 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Like a pair of socks, intentions and actions should match. Consistent with this 
expectation, we found evidence in four studies of an intention bias towards judgment of 
action. These embellishments occurred for real-time judgments of success, resulting in a 
distorted perception of the action itself. Actions were embellished when the actor first 
had choice of actions, but not in the absence of choice (Experiment 1), and also when the 
motivation for success was high (Experiments 3 & 4). In Experiment 2, participants were 
given a goal of failure (singing poorly), and success was exaggerated to seem worse than 
reality. This indicated that embellishment is not necessarily in a positive direction, but in 
the direction of intention. In Experiment 3, people reported themselves to be better at 
hitting targets they might want to hit (e.g. Hitler), compared to those they might not want 
to hit (e.g. Gandhi). Further, Experiment 3 found that the degree of embellishment 
corresponded with the intensity of intentionality.  Perceived marksmanship toward a 
given target improved with greater personal dislike toward that target. In a final study 
(Experiment 4), it was found that observers distorted the actions of other agents 
consistent with an intention bias. Observers perceived another person to be better at 
hitting pictures that the actor disliked (Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama), even when it 
may have conflicted with the observer’s own desires for the actor’s success.  These four 
studies indicate that an intention bias can automatically distort perceptions of action as it 
occurs, and that these inferences arise from the expected consistency between intention 
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Issues and Limitations 
Alternative Accounts 
In Experiments 1 and 2, intentionality was manipulated by the choice of action. 
Consistent with predictions, choice distorted perceived action to be consistent with the 
intention – either better typing performance (Experiment 1) or poorer singing 
performance (Experiment 2). The use of choice as a manipulation of intention may 
suggest a cognitive dissonance account for the results, that the perceived outcome was 
distorted because participants were motivated to see their actions be successful. For 
example, dissonance research shows that people readily revise their prior attitudes (e.g., 
against raising tuition) to match their present behavior (promoting raising tuition), but 
that this revision is dependent on the appearance of free choice in their behavior 
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Bem and McConnell, 1970). Experiments 3 and 4 help to 
address this issue, as these studies used the actor’s desire rather than choice as a 
manipulation of intention strength. And in Experiment 4, participants judged the action of 
another agent, so dissonance should not impact perceptions. Though embellishments may 
sometimes enhanced by motivational biases, the intention bias described here is primarily 
a cognitive inference based on the expectation that intentions cause action.   It is not 
clear, however, that a cognitive dissonance account should be inconsistent with an 
intention bias. Dissonance theory holds that people feel uncomfortable to have their 
thoughts and actions mismatched, and will alter whichever one is most ambiguous to 
match the other. Important, however, is the implicit assumption in cognitive dissonance 
theory that intentions and actions should match. As discussed above, the causal link   Action Embellishment               32 
 
 
between intention and action is so deep-seated in our social reasoning that it is often 
taken for granted.  The revisions of attitudes (and the intentions associated with them) 
demonstrated in dissonance research may be part of this more general belief about the 
mechanics of ideal agency. More recent studies of cognitive dissonance have found that 
the orientation toward action is a critical factor in producing cognitive dissonance effects. 
For example, there is greater post-decisional spreading of alternatives when people first 
the actions that they will undertake (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002).   
Elements of Intentionality 
  These studies focused on choice, desire, and to a lesser extent effort as measures 
of intentionality, but it is important to acknowledge the other components of 
intentionality not assessed here.  Intentionality is not a single quality but a composite of 
several factors, including the desire for an outcome (e.g. wanting a sports car), beliefs 
about how to act to get the desired outcome, (“Sports cars can be obtained from car 
dealers in exchange for money”), and planning to act, (“Tomorrow I will buy that car!”).   
In addition, there are some necessary precursors for an act to be intentional – an agent 
must be aware of the action as it occurs, and also believe that the action will result in the 
desired outcome (Malle & Knobe, 1997).  Not all of these factors need to be present for 
an act to be judged as intentional, however, intentionality is enhanced as these mental 
states align (Malle & Knobe, 1999).  These various components of intentionality could be 
categorized into two kinds of causal forces on action: the reasons for action, and the 
mechanics of action. An agent’s goal (the identification of a preferred outcome), desire 
(the particular valence of the goal), and beliefs (predictions of how action can accomplish 
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Conscious awareness and deliberate initiation of action may comprise the mechanics – 
how the intention seems to create action. Because intentionality is not a discrete mental 
state but a composite of different mental states, we used two manipulations of 
intentionality that best converge on overall intentionality:  the goal choice before action 
(Experiments 1 & 2), and motivation for success (Experiments 3 & 4). What is important 
here is that we should expect that additional elements of intentionality to have an additive 
effect on embellishment: as more factors are present, intentionality is strengthened, and 
embellishment is more likely.  In general, we should expect more embellishment when 
there is greater premeditation, motivation, decision, and effort. Indeed, the division of 
these intentional components may be reason for the additive effects of choice and effort 
observed in Experiment 1.    
Ability and expertise 
  Intentional actions must be produced by the abilities and skills of the agent, 
rather than a result of accident or luck (Malle & Knobe, 1997).  Therefore, the ability and 
expertise of the actor are important factors to that may impact action embellishment 
effects. The actions used in these studies were designed to be relatively easy to perform, 
but difficult to assess. We used tasks with somewhat familiar activities with novel 
variations, so that participants should be average in skill and low in expertise. In general 
we should expect more precise perceptions with expertise, as these individuals are more 
practiced and have may be a better judge of when they have performed well. Though 
expertise might be expected to moderate the degree of distortion, naïveté is not necessary 
for intention bias to influence perceptions of action.  Even if judgments were more 
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Even experts can embellish actions when conditions are right, i.e. the result is ambiguous, 
and prior intent was strong. 
   Likewise, embellishments are not necessarily constrained by actual poor ability. 
Generally people believe themselves to be effective agents even when they are not, and 
overestimate their skills at various activities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). More relevant 
than one’s true ability, are one’s beliefs about ability and self-efficacy that suggest how 
well one can expect to enact their intentions (Rotter, 1966). Expectations are different for 
individuals who are depressed, have low self-esteem or feel outcomes are beyond their 
control (Bandura, 1977). Consistent with this reasoning,  narcissists are more likely to 
commit extreme overestimates of competence (Ames & Kammrath, 2004), but people 
with low self-esteem show  reduced cognitive dissonance effects, that is they don’t revise 
prior intentions following a counter-attitudinal action (Stone, 2003).  
Reality Check  
In a few of the studies presented here, the difference between conditions in the 
perceived success of actions was relatively small- for instance in Experiment 1, people in 
the choice condition embellished their typing performance by ¼ of a letter on average, 
and in Experiment 3, the perceived distance to the bull’s-eye was less than a half-inch 
closer for the disliked target. These relatively small distortions raise the question: if 
action embellishment is possible, is it only in small amounts?  Intentionality can distort 
perceived action, but perceptions of action are always anchored to the actual 
performance, and can only be embellished so far. In other words, reality has a confidence 
interval. The size of this interval is constrained by what we believe to be possible events, 
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an outcome, or the effort we put towards that goal, there is a limit to how far we can bend 
reality.  A person may know that no matter how much he wants to or tries, he can’t lift a 
car over his head, or jump to the moon, so it is unlikely that he will believe he has done 
so.  
An extreme instance of action embellishment that exceeds the limits of rationality 
is found in the condition of anosognosia (also see: Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
Anosognosia results from stroke damage to the inferior parietal cortex of the right 
hemisphere (Bisiach & Gemininani, 1991).   As occurs in many strokes, patients 
experience some paralysis (in this case, on the left side of the body). But what 
distinguishes anosognosia from other conditions is that the patients don’t believe 
themselves to be paralyzed. Instead they not only falsely believe that they could move 
their impaired arm if they wished, but also confabulate actions of the limb as though they 
are hallucinating – seeing themselves clap their hands together, or touch their nose with 
the paralyzed arm as it rests motionless at the patient’s side.  Important, the illusions of 
action associated with anosognosia appear to be independent of the actual physical 
impairment, and may extend to parts of the body unaffected by paralysis.  In a key 
demonstration, one anosognosia patient was led to believe by a trick mirror that she was 
looking at her unparalysed arm when it was actually the reflected image of another 
person’s resting arm. When she deliberately moved her own arm up and down, she again 
said she saw the limp alien hand moving up and down, just as she had previously falsely 
reported for her own paralyzed arm (Ramachandran, 1995).  Ramachandran argues that 
the confabulatory symptoms of anosognosia result from damage to part of the right 
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parts of the left hemisphere act as imaginative story-tellers, interpreting (and sometimes 
exaggerating) the perceived environment (Gazzaniga 1988), this region of the right 
hemisphere works as a kind of devil’s advocate, questioning the plausibility of these 
interpretations. Anything that doesn’t stand up to the scrutiny will be dismissed, even 
before a person is conscious of the thought. Without such a reality check patients with 
anosognosia are free to accept any confabulation they like, regardless of glaring evidence 
to the contrary.    
 The effects of action embellishment reported here represent an example of this 
phenomenon in a non-clinical population. People showed a distorted perception of the 
actual success – for example, the actual distance to a target seemed to grow or shrink in 
their eyes. It is possible that these minute distortions can be increased as time passes, and 
become the basis for later memory distortions and general evaluations. In the meantime, 
as action is observed, these minor distortions would pass a reality check because they are 
both consistent with expectations, and not far from the truth.  
 
Conclusion 
 The success of any given action depends how well it brings about a desired 
outcome, or how closely it resembles the intentions of the actor. Unfortunately, such ideal 
agency is not always possible, and even the strongest intentions can fail to achieve a 
satisfactory action.  In four studies it was found that action embellishment can result from 
an intention bias- the expectation that high intentionality leads to greater success. In 
maintaining an ideal perception of agency, success may be embellished to match 
intentions, distorting the very perception of action as it occurs.    Action Embellishment               37 
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Table 1.  
Mean Actual and Reported distance to bull’s eye by Target, Experiment 3.  
 
  Target Liking    Distance to Bull’s eye (in inches) 
Target  Rank  Rating  Actual  Reported  Difference 
Martin Luther King  1  6.70  6.29  6.91  -.61 
Mahatma Gandhi  2  6.48  6.10  6.89  -.80 
Albert Einstein  3  5.31  6.10  6.80  -.70 
John F. Kennedy  4  5.15  6.23  6.98  -.73 
OJ Simpson  5  -4.56  6.24  6.89  -.65 
Saddam Hussein  6  -5.50  6.04  6.58  -.54 
Osama Bin Laden  7  -5.96  6.20  6.70  -.50 
Adolf Hitler  8  -6.51  6.04  6.48  -.43 
Linear Contrast F(112)  1.02  5.40*  6.36* 
 
Note.  Distance reported in inches, greater values indicate further distance from bull’s 
eye.  N = 113, *p < .05, 
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Table 2.  
Judgments of prior  intention and retrospective success for pitcher’s throws at Obama 
and Clinton, by condition, Experiment 4 
 
 
  Condition 
  Clinton supporter    Obama Supporter 
  Mean   (SD)    Mean   (SD) 
Intention to hit Clinton  2.94  (1.84)    5.86  (1.33) 
Intention to hit Obama  5.25  (1.85)    2.39  (1.52) 
Retrospective success – Clinton  4.03  (1.47)    4.69  (1.64) 
Retrospective success- Obama  4.39  (1.41)    3.86  (1.73)   Action Embellishment               46 
 
 
 Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Actual and Perceived typing performance by choice, Experiment 1 
Figure 2. Mediation between condition and retrospective embellishment by perceived 
intention of actor, Experiment 4.  
   Action Embellishment               47 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Betas are standardized coefficients. Parenthetical coefficients represent direct effect 
of target speed and positivity with no mediator in the model. Asterisks indicate 
significant relations (*p < .05, ** p < .001). 
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